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Abstract
Operational testing, which aims to generate sequences of test cases with the
same statistical properties as those that would be experienced in real
operational use, can be used to obtain quantitative measures of the reliability
of software. In the case of safety critical software it is common to demand
that all known faults are removed. This means that if there is a failure during
the operational testing, the offending fault must be identified and removed.
Thus an operational test for safety criticalsoftware takes the form of a
specified number of test cases (or a specified period of working) that must
be executed failure-free. This paper addresses the problem of specifying the
numbers of test cases (or time periods) required for a test, when the
previous test has terminated as a result of a failure. It has been proposed
that, after the obligatory fix of the offending fault, the software should be
treated as if it were completely novel, and be required to pass exactly the
same test as originally specified. The reasoning here claims to be
conservative, inasmuch as no credit is given for any previous failure-free
operation prior to the failure that terminated the test. We show that, in fact,
this is not a conservative approach in all cases, and propose instead some
new Bayesian stopping rules. We show that the degree of conservatism in
stopping rules depends upon the precise way in which the reliability
requirement is expressed. We define a particular form of conservatism that
seems desirable on intuitive grounds, and show that the stopping rules that
exhibit this conservatism are also precisely the ones that seem preferable on
other grounds.
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1 Background and motivation
The problem described here arose during recent discussions, in which one of
the authors was involved, associated with the assessment of the software-based
primary protection system of a nuclear reactor. The actual licensing process was based
upon qualitative arguments, but the utility company volunteered to provide the regulator
with a statistical demonstration that the system’s probability of failure upon demand
(pfd) had achieved the design requirement of 10-3, independently of the licensing
process. The comparative modesty of this requirement arises as a result of there being
several other lines of defence against unacceptable accidents - most notably, a simple,
non-software-based, secondary system. It should be noted that this testing formed only
a part of the evaluation of this software-based protection system, and did not form part
of the licensing process.
Here a ‘demand’ constitutes a set of circumstances, represented by sensor
readings, that require the reactor to be shut down safely and kept thereafter in a safe
state. The utility owned a simulator which it was agreed could produce input trajectories
- the demands - that were statistically representative of those that the system would have
to meet in real operational use. It was also accepted that it could be decided correctly in
each case whether the demand had been correctly executed. It was therefore required
that the system be placed on test, be proffered 5000 demands, and show no failures. In
the classical frequentist statistical framework, this ensures that 10-3 is (approximately) a
99% upper confidence bound on the true pfd [Parnas et al. 1991]. In fact 4603
perfectly executed demands gives a 99% bound; Bayesian analysis gives similar results
[Miller et al. 1992, Littlewood & Strigini 1993].
The stopping rule here is clear: the demands will be executed until either a
failure occurs, in which case the system has failed the test, or 4603 demands have been
executed failure-free, in which case the system has passed the test.
The problem arises in the event that a failure does occur. The regulator (and,
indeed, the utility) will regard the system as not acceptable, and it would be necessary
to remove the fault that has been revealed before considering the system as a candidate
for a further test.
Notice that, if the testing were allowed to continue (even without any attempt to
remove the newly-found fault), a sufficient number of perfectly-executed demands
might eventually be clocked up that even with the one failure within the total number
executed we would still obtain a 99% upper confidence bound of 10-3 pfd. In fact a
total of 6636 demands would be required.
The stopping rule here arises mainly for non-statistical reasons: we take the
reasonable conservative position that, in view of the safety-critical nature of the system,
it could not be licensed for use whilst containing a known fault, whatever the evidence
that it nevertheless met the pfd requirement. The regulator thus insists on being shown
evidence that any fault found in testing has been removed, and then argues that the only
positive vidence in favour of the system that he/she will accept from testing is the
amount of perfect working since the last fault-removal.
In our discussions of this testing scenario, the question arose: what new testing
requirement should be imposed upon the system following a failure of this well-defined
test? In particular, is it reasonable to require that the new version of the software be
given exactly the same hurdle to overcome as was initially devised? The intuitive
objection to such an approach is that it ignores the fact that we have received some
information from the first test; in particular, in the event that the failure that terminated
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the test occurred after executing only a small number of demands, we have received
some bad news. A regulator might reasonably be wary of ignoring such information
and merely requiring the same target be achieved from the new test. The fact that a
failure has been observed early in test may, for example, be evidence of low software
quality, as a result of poor production practices, or of unacceptable characteristics of the
system (for example, excessive complexity). Such a wariness seems reasonable when
we note that, even if discovered faults were never fixed, and regardless of the true
probability of failure on demand, if we repeatedly put the system through tests
comprising 4603 statistically representative d mands, eventually it will succeed in
passing a test.
It seems unlikely that the regulator will in reality have the luxury of demanding
of the utility that it scrap the existing system and start again - if we could take this
course, it might be reasonable to suggest that the new system should be subjected to the
same acceptance criterion as the first. Although even here it might be argued that there
should be some carry-over of evidence. For example, if the same development team
were used, we might think that their failure to make the first system pass the test was
evidence that they were not greatly competent, and this might depress our expectations
of their likely success on their second try. Equally, the first failure might make us
believe more strongly that the problem being tackled in building the system is a
‘difficult’ one, and that any putative solution is thus more likely to fail.
What is needed, therefore, is a modification of the above simple stopping rule
that allows failures to occur during test, and consequent removal of the faults that these
reveal, but which takes into account this potential ‘bad news’ in specifying the further
number of failure-free demands that must be executed.
The intention here is to devise stopping rules that retain the flavour of the one
described above. That is, we require a stopping rule that allows the parties at any time
during a test to agree that ‘if the system executes n further demands without failure it
will be deemed to have passed the test, otherwise testing must continue.’
More formally, we require a rule of the following kind:
1 At the start of test, we compute the number, n1, of demands that must be
executed failure-free for the test to succeed and stop.
2 The system is put on test and either successfully executes the n1 demands,
in which case the test stops and the system is declared to have achieved its
pfd requirement, or a failure is observed on demand s1 (<n1), in which case
the test is stopped.
3 In the light of the evidence of one failure in s1 demands, we compute the
number, n2, of further demands that must be executed failure-free for the
next test to succeed and stop.
4 The system is put on test again and either successfully executes the n2
demands, in which case the test stops and the system is declared to have
achieved its pfd requirement, or a failure is observed on demand s1 + s2
(s2<n2), in which case this test is stopped.
And so on. Clearly, it is not certain that in practice the process will terminate, in
contrast to the procedure whereby the system is repeatedly put back on test with the
same stopping rule. This is in accord with intuition, since termination implies that the
system is finally acceptable and this may never be the case. Essentially what is
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happening is a competition between the Ôgood newsÕ represented by the most recent
failure-free executions, and the information coming from the accumulating failures.
In the next section we present Bayesian solutions to this problem which retain
some of the conservatism that a regulator might desire. This deals with the problem in
the context of a demand-based system, as above; Section 3 treats the similar problem
concerning the testing of a system that is required to operate continuously.
The conservatism in the approach we adopt is very much motivated by the
practical application from which this work arose. It is certainly possible to adopt a more
conservative approach than ours. In particular, we do not take account of the possibility
that the ÔfixÕ of a fault may itself introduce a new fault with an unbounded effect upon
the unreliability of the system: clearly it would be necessary to introduce more
modelling assumptions to take account of such an effect. We discuss this issue at more
length in Section 4.
2 Stopping rules for demand-based systems
We shall assume that successive demands are statistically independent Bernoulli
trials. Statistical independence between successive demands is clearly an idealisation,
but it seems reasonable in the nuclear example, since demands are likely to far apart in
time and thus there is no memory of the external circumstances of an earlier demand.
Furthermore, after start-up following a trip it might be reasonable to assume that there
is no ÔmemoryÕ in the system itself of the circumstances prior to the shut-down. 
Let p be the probability of failure on demand. Thus, given p, the number of
failures in n demands, R, has a Binomial distribution:
P(R= r)=nCr pr (1- p)n- r (1)
and in particular
P(R= 0) = (1- p)n (2)
Within the Bayesian framework a person represents his or her a priori
knowledge about the parameter of interest, here p, by the prior distribution. There are
advantages in using a prior distribution from the conjugate family: it has the property
that both prior and posterior distribution will be members of the same parametric family
of distributions and thus represents a kind of homogeneity in the way in which our
beliefs change as we receive extra information. In this case the conjugate distribution is
the Beta(a,b) distribution:
f (p) = p
a - 1(1- p)b- 1
B(a,b)         (3)
where B(a,b) is the Beta function and a>0, b>0 are chosen by the observer (e.g. the
regulator in the nuclear example) to represent his or her belief about p prior to seeing
any test results.
In some cases it might be possible to use information about the system and its
development process to give numerical values for aand b. Here we shall concentrate on
the case where no such information is available, and use the ÔignoranceÕ uniform prior
with a=b=1:
f (p) = 1 (4)
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If the system has executed n demands, and we have seen r failures, the
posterior distribution of p is Beta(+r,b+n-r):
f (p|r,n,a,b) =
pa+ r - 1(1- p)b+ n- r - 1
B(a + r,b + n - r)
(5)
which reduces to
f (p|r,n,1,1)=
pr(1- p)n- r
B(1+ r,1+ n - r)
(6)
for the uniform prior.
2.1 A pfd-based stopping rule
We now compute n1 by asking what is the minimum number of demands that,
if executed without failure, would allow us to conclude that the system had met its pfd
target. For the case discussed earlier, the requirement could be framed in the Bayesian
context as
P(p < 10- 3) ³ 0.99 (7)
More generally we could express the requirement as a pair (p0, ) such that
P(p < p0) ³ 1- (8)
From (6), n1 is the smallest value of n f r which
(1- p)ndp
B(1,1+ n)0
p0
ò ³ 1 - (9)
If the system is placed on test and failure actually occurs after s1 (<n1)
demands, we compute n2, the number of further demands that must now be executed
failure-free to satisfy the reliability requirement, as follows. The posterior distribution
for p immediately following the failure on the s1 th d mand is
f (p|1,s1,1,1)=
p(1- p)s1 - 1
B(2,s1)
(10)
which becomes our prior distribution for p for the further testing that will be conducted.
To compute n2, we need the posterior distribution after seeing n2 further demands all
executed failure-free; this is
f (p|1,s1 + n2,1,1)=
p(1- p)s1 + n2 - 1
B(2,s1 + n2)
(11)
Notice that this is simply the posterior distribution after seeing both (s1-1) failure-free
demands, followed by a failure, and then 2 further failure-free demands. In fact this
posterior distribution will be the same whenever the single failure occurred among the
s1+n2 demands: it depends only upon the total number of demands, and the number of
failures. Now n2 is the smallest value of n f r which
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p(1- p)s1 + n- 1dp
B(2,s1 + n)0
p0
ò ³ 1- (12)
This process continues. In general, if we have just seen the jth failure, and the
failures occurred on the s1th, (s1+s2)th, . . , (s1+s2 .  .  +sj)th demands, we should
require a further nj+1 demands to be executed failure-free, where nj+1 is the smallest
value of n for which
pj (1- p)
si
1
j
å + n- j
dp
B( j + 1, si
1
j
å + n - j + 1)0
p0
ò ³ 1- (13)
For the example we considered earlier, where (p0, ) = (0.001,0.01), we find
from (9) that n1=4602. Let us assume now that this first test fails, i.e. there is a failure
before 4602 demands have been exercised. If this failure occurs on the 1000th demand,
i.e. s1=1000, from (12) we find that the length of the further test required after the fault
has been removed is n2=5635. In other words, a failure during the first test occurring
as early as the 1000th demand suggests that we should be wary of this system and
demand that the test it be required to pass after the removal of the offending fault be
more stringent than the original test. The worst situation of all would be if the failure in
the first test occurred on the first demand, i.e. s1=1, in which case n2=6634. The best
news that it is possible to obtain from the test, short of passing it by correctly executing
the 4602 demands, is for a failed demand to occur for the first time on the 4602nd
demand, i.e. s1=4602, in which case n2=2033.
What happens here is that a failure early in the test is bad news, and the next test
needs to be correspondingly longer in order that we have the required confidence in the
reliability of the system. A failure occurring late in the test, on the other hand, does not
completely outweigh the confidence that we have gained from the previous failure-free
working, and so the length of failure-free working required in the next test is
correspondingly reduced. The break-even point occurs when s1=2033, i which case
n2=4602 and the second test has the same length as the first.
Number of failures, j Total number of demands, N
0 4602
1 6635
2 8402
3 10041
4 11600
5 13104
6 14566
7 15995
8 17397
9 18778
Table 1: Total number of demands, N, needed if there
have been exactly j failed demands, so as to claim
(p0, ) = (0.001,0.01).
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Notice the symmetry of this result with that of s1=4602 and n2=2033 in the
preceding paragraph: this results from the fact that in this model we draw the same
conclusion from having seen 1 failure in 6635 (i.e. 2033+4602) demands regar less of
when this failure occurred during the sequence of demands. This observation allows us
to simplify the computations in order to use this stopping rule in practice. It is not
necessary to carry out the incomplete Beta computations of (9), (12) and (13)
dynamically as we successively observe particular s1, s2, . . Instead we need only
compute, for a particular (p0, ) reliability requirement, the total number of demands
(failure-free and failed) that must be observed for j failed demands to satisfy the
requirement (for j = 1, 2, . .). Table 1 shows these numbers for the case
(p0, ) = (0.001,0.01) considered earlier.
This table can be computed before the test(s) are carried out. As failures occur
the lengths of subsequent tests ar  computed as follows. Suppose the first failure
occurs on the 1200th demand, i.e. s1=1200. From the Table we see that a minimum
6635 demands need to be executed in total if one failed demand is to be allowed. Thus a
further n2=5335 demands need to be executed failure-free following the removal of the
fault associated with this first failure. If now the second test ends in failure after a
further 2500 demands, i.e. 2=2500 and there have been 3700 demands executed since
testing began, then the third test requires n3=4702 (=8402-3700) demands to be
executed failure-free.
The formulation of the reliability requirement in terms of a pair (p0, ),
although analysed here within the Bayesian framework, retains the flavour of a
classical, frequentist, confidence bound. However, it should be noted that the
interpretation of the bound is more natural in this Bayesian form than it is classically:
when we say here that P(p < p0) = 1 -  (approximately, since in practice we must
stop the test after an integer number of tests, and this may correspond to a confidence
slightly larger than 1-a ) the probability statement really does concern the random
variable p. This contrasts with the frequentist interpretation, in which the bound s the
subject of the probability statement: i.e. we are asserting that, of all the bounds that we
might have computed, a proportion 1 -( ) will exceed the true (but unknown) p.
The frequentist bounds give results for the stopping rule that are very close to
those obtained from theBayesian approach if, as here, we use the uniform prior
distribution. In fact it can be shown (see Appendix) that the entries in tables such as that
above will exceed the Bayesian ones by precisely 1. Thus for the numerical example
used here, as we have already seen, the frequentist goal is 4603 failure-free demands at
the outset of the test; it is N=6636 when j=1, and so on.
2.2 A reliability prediction-based stopping rule
A weakness of the (p0, ) formulation of the reliability goal is that it does not
address directly the matter of real interest: how confident are we that this system will
function adequately during its life? Merely being 99% confident that the pfd is smaller
than 0.001 is not sufficient for us to be able to say how confident we are that the
system will survive, say, the number of demands that are expected in a year. In the case
of a reactor protection system, and other critical systems, it seems imperative that we
have a measure of the likelihood of unacceptable behaviour during a specified period of
operation.
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It seems likely that in practice this formulation of the reliability requirement is
taken to mean that when the test is passed we can, for all intents and purposes, treat the
pfd as actually being 10-3, since the 99% confidence that it is not larger than this is the
same as ‘almost certainty’. This would, of course, be a dangerously misleading view.
There is a 1% chance that the true pfd takes a value in the interval (0.001,1), and we
have absolutely no information from this analysis of the overall contribution to the
unreliability from this component of uncertainty. We are therefore not able to draw any
conclusion about the reliability (in particular, the probability of surviving a certain
number of demands failure-free) of the system.
The Bayesian approach admits a formal and rigorous theory of prediction. We
can formulate a proper reliability requirement as a pair (n0, )  for which
P no failures in the next n0 demands( ) ³ 1- (14)
The Bayesian predictive distribution for the number of failures Rf in the next (future) nf
demands, if we have seen r failures in the past n demands, is
P Rf = r f |r,n,a,b( ) = P Rf = r f |p( ) f p|r,n,a,b( ) dp
0
1
ò
=
n fCr f p
r f (1- p)
nf - r f p
a + r - 1(1- p)b+ n - r - 1
B(a + r,b + n - r)0
1
ò dp (15)
The mean and variance of this mixed distribution are
E(Rf ) = nf
a + r
a + b + n
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
Var(Rf ) = nf
a + r
a + b + n
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 1 -
a + r
a + b + n
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
a + b + n + nf
a + b + n + 1
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
and it thus has a larger spread, as expected, than a corresponding Binomial distribution
because of our uncertainty about the value of p.
Similarly, the distribution of the number of further failure-free demands, X, has
a greater spread than the corresponding geometric distribution; in fact
E(X) =
b + n - r
a + r - 1
= ,  
Var(X) = ( + 1)
a + r
a + r - 2
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
and so the coefficient of variation is greater than for the geometric.
Now, to find the total number of demands the system needs to execute,
including r failures, in order to pass the test, we put rf = 0 and nf = n0 in (15), and
solve for N, the smallest value of n f r which the expression (15) exceeds 1-a . We
shall take the uniform prior, a=b=1, in what follows, as before.
Stopping rules for operational testing of safety-critical software9
_____________________________________________________________________
In order to compare this new prediction-based stopping rule with the earlier
one, we shall choose the reliability requirement (n0, )  in order that the initial
requirement for the number of failure-free demands is the same, i.e. 4602. In other
words, from (15), n0 is the largest value of n f r which
1 - p( ) n 1 - p( )
4602
B(1,1+ 4602)0
1
ò dp³ 1 - (16)
Clearly there are an infinite number of (n0, )  pairs that satisfy (16). A solution
that approximates most closely to the confidence level of the earlier example is
(46,0.009895): here 46 is the nearest that an integer value for n0 gives to the a =0.01 of
the earlier example. Another solution that is of interest is (1000,0.178476), since
requiring 103 failure-free demands with a specified probability is ‘similar to’ asking for
a pfd of 10-3 with a specified probability. An intermediate solution is (500,0.097982).
Table 2 shows the total numbers of demands that must be executed in order to pass the
test with differing numbers of failures being allowed: this table is directly comparable to
Table 1.
Number
of
failures,
j
Total number of
demands, N, for
(n0, )=(46, .009895)
Total number of
demands, N, for
(n0, )=(500, .097982)
Total number of
demands, N, for
(n0, )=(1000, .178476)
0 4602 4602 4602
1 9229 9450 9681
2 13855 14298 14766
3 18481 19147 19852
4 23107 23996 24938
5 27734 28845 30024
6 32360 33694 35111
7 36986 38543 40198
8 41612 43392 45285
9 46239 48241 50372
Table 2: Total number of demands, N, needed if there
have been exactly j failed demands, so as to claim
(n0, ) . Notice in each case how close to linear is the
increase in N with j.
When we compare Tables 1 and 2, it is notable how in Table 2 N increases
more rapidly with j than is the case in Table 1. This is in spite of the fact that the
reliability goals have been chosen to be similar at the outset: i.e. the different ways of
expressing the reliability requirement represented by (n0, )  and (p0, ) all have in
common that they will be satisfied by the same number of completely failure-free
demands, 4602. It suggests that the effect of failures in the case of a test for a
prediction-based requirement is more serious than for a requirement based on a bound
for p. Since we would argue that these prediction-based requirements are more suitable
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for safety-critical systems, it appears that when failures are observed a more
conservative stopping rule needs to be applied.
It is notable that in each of the three examples of the prediction-based
procedure, the number of failure-free demands to be processed following observation
of at least one failed demand is always more stringent than the original demand. Thus in
the case of a requirement (46, .009895), even if the first failure occurs on the 4602nd
demand - the most optimistic case - and thus causes the first test to fail, the second test
will still require 4627 (i.e. 9229-4602) failure-free demands, i.e. more than was
required for the original test. This contrasts with the previous procedure for which it
was only early failures that increased the stringency of the second test over the first.
Notice that this increased stringency is even greater for the other two examples
of (n0, ) : in fact it can be shown that whatever numerical values we assign to (n0, ) ,
there will be this increase in stringency here so long as n0>1 (see Appendix for proof),
and it will grow as n0 grows.
We regard this property as a desirable one: it captures the intuitively appealing
notion that the fact of a test ending in a failure is ‘bad news’, and the system should
therefore be penalised by being required to pass a more stringent future test. The
regulator in our original nuclear application regarded his approach as ‘conservative’ in
the sense that he was giving no credit for successful operation prior to a failure. The
present approach, in always regarding an unsuccessful test as an actual demerit, is more
conservative. We think that this is an important advantage: it accords better with our
informal intuition than the pfd bound approach, which is only partially conservative in
this sense.
2.3 A practical consideration
In the above it is assumed that the n demands for a particular test will be
generated sequentially by independent selection from the population of all demands,
with the probabilities of selection of different demands reflecting those of operational
use, and they will be executed as they are generated. In pr ctice, however, it may not
be convenient to execute the demands in this order.
In the case of the reactor protection system testing that motivated this work, the
operational profile of demands was defined in two stages. First, some basic demand
scenarios were identified: SC1, . . . SCk. Each scenario represents a particular type of
demand, such as a pipe break involving loss of coolant. Within each scenario, the
individual demands were defined via parameters, such as size and location of pipe
break. The probability distribution over scenarios, and the distributions over demands
(parameters) within each scenario, determine the operational profile. Successive
demands are then generated independently by first selecting a scenario and then
selecting a demand within a scenario, using these distributions.
In this case it was convenient to generate the demands off-line before testing
began, but to execute them in batches corresponding to the different scenarios. That is,
the order of execution was non-random. It is easy to see that, in this case, all n
demands must be executed before the test terminates: we cannot terminate the test at the
first failure in this non-random sequence, because this may not be the first failure in the
(correct) randomly ordered sequence.
However, we can still use tables such as those above to compute the stopping
rules, since these depend only upon the total number of failures experienced and the
number of demands executed, and not upon when these failed demands occurred.
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Thus, for example, if the requirement is a 99% confidence that the pfd is be ter than
10-3 as in Section 2.1, and one failure is observed in the first test of 4602 demands,
then the next test would be of length 2033 demands (6635-4602 from Table 1). If there
is a further failure in this second test, then the third test would need to be of length
1767 (i.e. 8402-6635 from Table 1). Similar reasoning can be used for the reliability
prediction-based stopping rule of Section 2.2.
3 Stopping rules for continuous-time systems
In this section we develop some Bayesian stopping rules for the reliability of
continuously operating software, such as that in active control systems. Thus we need
first to compute the time t1 that must be executed failure-free for us to conclude that the
software has met its reliability target, and so the test can be stopped. If a failure occurs
before this time has elapsed, say at time 1<t1, w then need to compute the fur r
time, t2, of failure-free working that the new (fixed) software must achieve for us to
conclude that the target reliability has been reached and stop the test. And so on.
We shall assume that failures occur in a simple Poisson process with rate .
Clearly, the reasonableness of this assumption will depend upon the application: the
most important point will be to be assured that the system and its environment have a
sufficiently short memory. This may be reasonable in a safety-critical pplication,
where we might expect successive failures to be very far apart.
The number of failures, R, in time t has a Poisson distribution:
P(R = r) =
( t)r e- t
r!
(17)
and in particular
P(R = 0) = e- t (18)
The conjugate family here is the Gamma. Thus if we represent our a priori
belief about the failure rate  by Gamma(a, b), the posterior for after seeing r failures
during time t  is Gamma(a+r, b+t):
p( |r,t;a,b) =
(b + t)a+ r a+ r - 1e- (b+ t)
G (a + r)
(19)
As usual in the Bayesian framework, there is no ‘obvious’ ignorance prior. In
what follows we have used the widely used improper uniform prior distribution, which
treats all values of the parameter as equally likely:
p( ) = 1 (20)
This gives the (proper) posterior:
p( |r,t) = Gamma(r + 1,t) (21)
which reduces to
p( |0,t) = te- t (22)
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in the case where r=0; this is Gamma(1,t).
3.1 A rate-based stopping rule
As in the demand-based situation of Section 2, the classical statistical approach
to this problem expresses the reliability target in terms of a confidence bound. Thus we
might demand that the failure rate, , be less than 10-3 with 99% confidence. In the
Bayesian framework we have
P( < 10- 3|r,t;a,b) = 0.99 (23)
Once again, notice that this is interpreted as a proper probability statement about the
parameter of interest, , unlike the interpretation of a classical bound.
More generally we can express the reliability requirement as a pair (0, ) uch
that
P( < 0|r,t;a,b) = 1 - (24)
Clearly, t1 is the value of t satisfying
p( |0,t;a,b)d = 1-
0
0
ò (25)
which for the case of the uniform improper prior becomes
te- td = 1 -
0
0
ò
and so
t1 = -
ln
0
(26)
Thus, for example when 0=0.001 and =0.01 as above, t1=4605.17.
If a failure occurs before this time has elapsed in the first test, say at time 1,
and after the fault has been identified and fixed the program is put on test again, the
time t2 of failure-free working that is needed to achieve the reliability target is the value
of t satisfying
p( |1, 1 + t)d = 1 -
0
0
ò
In  the case of the uniform prior this becomes
Gamma(2, 1 + t)d = 1-
0
0
ò  (27)
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In general, if the first j tests have terminated in a failure, the duration of the
(j+1)th test, tj+1, is the value of t satisfying
Gamma( j + 1, 1 + 2 + ... j + t)d = 1 -
0
0
ò (28)
Notice that this is a function only of the number of failures and the total time
that the software has been on test. We are thus able to simplify the calculation of the test
sizes as in Section 2.1. Table 3 shows how this is done in the case of the example
above where (0, )=(0.001,0.01).
Thus if the first test terminates with a failure at 1=2600, the amount of failure-
free working required from the second test is t2=4038.35 (6638.35-2600). If this
second test terminates with a failure after 2=1000, the amount of failure-free working
from the third test will be t3=4805.95 (8405.95-2600-1000), and so on.
Number of failures, j Total elapsed time on test, t
0 4605.17
1 6638.35
2 8405.95
3 10045.12
4 11604.63
5 13108.48
6 14570.62
7 15999.96
8 17402.65
9 18783.12
Table 3: Total elapsed time on test, t, needed if there
have been exactly j failed demands, so as to claim
( 0, )=(0.001,0.01).
In the appendix we show that this Bayesian analysis, using the uniform prior
for , gives exactly the same numerical results for tables like this as would be obtained
by the frequentist approach.
As in Section 2.1 for the demand-based system, this procedure based upon a
confidence for the failure rate is not ‘conservative’ in the sense that we defined at the
end of Section 2.2: the amount of further failure-free working needed to terminate
successfully a test that follows a failure may be smaller than the earlier amount. Thus, if
the first test fails at 1=4000, the system will pass the following test if it survives
failure-free for t2=2638.35 (6638.35-4000); this is less stringent than was required
initially (t1=4605.17). In the next section we develop a stopping rule where the success
criterion is expressed in terms of predictive reliab lity, rather than, as here, as a rate
bound. This procedure is conservative: the amounts of testing in successive tests are
guaranteed to be increasing.
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3.2 A reliability prediction-based stopping rule
As for the demand-based system, it seems sensible here to have the possibility
of specifying the reliability target in t rms of a prediction about future failure-free
behaviour. Thus we could formulate the requirement as a pair (t0, a ) uch that
P(no failures in next t0) = 1 - (29)
Now P(no failure in next t0|j failures in t)
= e- t0 p( |j,t)d  =
0
¥
ò  e- t0Gamma( j + 1,t)d
0
¥
ò  =  
t
t + t0
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ 
j + 1
(30)
if we use the same uniform prior as previously. Thus, in the same notation as before,
tj+1 is the value for which
t
t + t0
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ 
j + 1
= 1 - ,  i.e. 
t = 1 + 2 + ...+ j + tj + 1 = t0
(1- )
1
j + 1
1 - (1- )
1
j + 1
= t0
j + 1
- log(1- )
-
1
2
+ O(1j)
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
(31)
as j ® ¥ .
As in section 2, we proceed to compare this approach to the one of the previous
section by choosing (t0, a ) so that t1 takes the same value as there: i.e. t1=4605.17. We
have then
4605.17= t0
1 -æ 
è 
ö 
ø (32)
From the infinite number of solutions to (32), in Table 4 we show those for
(46.517,0.01), (500,0.097940), (1000,0.178407). These are chosen for similar
reasons to those of Table 2 in Section 2.
This table is used exactly as before. Notice, again, that the stopping rules for
the values computed in the table are conservative, inasmuch as the amount of failure-
free working that must be observed following a failure always exceeds the amount
needed for the previous test: e.g. in the first column, if the first failure occurs after
precisely 4605.17 time units, the amount of failure-free working in the next test for
successful completion is 4628.40 (9233.57-4605.17) time units. In the appendix we
prove that the stopping rules are always conservative in this sense.
Number
of
failures,
j
Total elapsed time, t, for
(t0, )=(46.517,0.01)
Total elapsed time, t, for
(t0, )=(500,0.097940)
Total elapsed time, t, for
(t0, )=(1000,0.178407)
0 4605.17 4605.17 4605.17
1 9233.57 9453.89 9685.78
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2 13861.96 14304.05 14771.85
3 18490.36 19154.56 19859.28
4 23118.76 24005.22 24947.26
5 27747.16 28855.95 30035.51
6 32375.57 33706.72 35123.91
7 37003.97 38557.52 40212.41
8 41632.37 43408.33 45300.98
9 46260.77 48259.15 50389.60
Table 4: Total elapsed time, t, needed if there have been
exactly j failed demands, so as to claim (t0, ). As in
Table 2, notice in each case how close to linear is the
increase in N with j.
4 Discussion
It could be said that the procedures outlined here are somewhat pessimistic in
not giving any credit for the faults that have been removed. It might be argued that it is
known that after each failure, when the testing is resumed, the software will be more
reliable than it was immediately prior to failure, as a result of a fault being removed. In
the above analysis, in contrast, the same reliability is assumed at all stages in the testing
process.
We defend this pessimism on the grounds that for safety-critical systems it is
necessary to be conservative in the absence of hard evidence to the contrary. Here we
would have no evidence of the exact contribution to the overall system unreliability
made by the fault that has just been removed: in particular, there is no lower bound that
we can place upon this contribution, even if we could be sure that its removal had been
successful. What small empirical evidence there is about the magnitudes of the
contributions made by individual software faults to overall system unreliability suggests
that these can vary by several orders of magnitude, and can be very sm ll [Adams
1984]. The assumption made here, therefore, that there is no improvement in the
reliability as a result of even a perfect fix seems the only one that is safely conservative.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which the above procedures are not
conservative since they do not allow for the possibility that an attempt to remove a fault
may not be successful. The least serious consequence could be a simple failure in the
fixing process, leaving the fault (and thus the system reliability) unchanged. This does
fit into the scenario described above, but is unlikely to arise in practice since regression
testing (in addition to the operational testing being discussed here) would detect it.
More serious is the possibility that the removal attempt itself introduces a novel
fault, since this has an unbounded potential to worsen the reliability. It is this concern
that prompted the original approach to this problem, in which exactly the same size of
test was required to be passed by the repaired system as was required of the original
system. It was reasoned that the repaired system was a ‘new’ system and it was
therefore safest to regard ourselves as being completely ignorant of its reliability - just
as we had been of the original system.
We have shown above that this informal approach is not, in a particular sense,
conservative. Thus for a reliability requirement expressed as a (p0, ) pfd bound, or as
a ( 0, ) bound for the failure rate, in the event that failure occurs early in the test, the
system ought to be required to pass a more stringent test than the original. The intuitive
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reason for this is that an early failure is evidence that the system is of ‘poor quality’,
and correspondingly greater ‘good news’ will be needed to overcome this ‘bad news’.
This is the case whether we adopt a Bayesian or classical analysis. However, these
bounds are not conservative in the sense that, if the failure occurs sufficiently late in the
test, the requirement for the next test will be less stringent than the current one.
However, in the case of a requirement formulated in terms of a proper
prediction of reliability, (n0 ) in the discrete case and (t0, ) in the continuous case,
we have shown that there is conservatism in this sense: e numb rof failure-free
demands that must be observed will always be greater following a failed demand
whenever this occurs (i.e. this conservatism does not only relate to early failures).
Notwithstanding the conservatism discussed above, it has to be admitted that
the underlying model used in all of the analysis of this paper is not sufficiently
conservative inasmuch as it does not admit the possibility of there being an arbitrarily
large increase in the probability of failure on demand as a result of a bad fix. Instead,
the model effectively assumes that the ‘true’ pfd, o  the ‘true’ failure rate, remains the
same throughout, with the earlier conservatism discussed above relating only to our
beliefs in (in the Bayesian analysis), or our estimation  of (in the classical context), the
pfd or failure rate. It seems worth trying to formulate a model that plausibly represents
the fault-fixing operation, so that we can take account of the possibility that a fix may
make the true reliability worse than it was before the failure occurred. This does not
seem to be an easy task, and will not be addressed here.
However, it is clear that such a model will be more conservative than the
approaches considered above, which brings us to the question of what is the best way
forward as things stand. We believe that the second, more conservative, reliability-
based approach discussed here is the more appropriate for dealing with safety-critical
systems. It seems to us that the user (or in the example that motivated this work, the
regulator or the utility) is interested in ‘how well the system will perform’ - i.e. a
reliability requirement based directly upon a reliability prediction - rather than a bound
on the pfd or failure rate. The latter, particularly in the classical frequentist context, do
not allow us to say anything about the former. One might ask what one could conclude
practically from an assertion that the 99% upper confidence bound on the probability of
failure is 10-3. It would seem very rash in a critical application to act as if the true pfd
really were 10-3 merely because 99% represents ‘high’ confidence.
The advantage of the Bayesian approach is that it admits a proper predictive
distribution for the number of failures we shall see in a specified number of future
demands (or specified period of working in the continuous case), and thus a proper
probability that we shall see no failures in these future demands. There is no equivalent
formal theory of prediction in the classical frequentist context, and one has to resort to
ad hoc approaches such as the ‘plug in’ rule, where the maximum likelihood (or some
other) estimator of the pfd is treated as the true value and substituted into the conditional
formula for the reliability function. Unlike the Bayesian approach, this takes no account
of our uncertainty about the estimator, and thus cannot be regarded as sufficiently
conservative for safety-critical applications.
Newcomers to the Bayesian approach to statistical inference, particularly those
with a background in classical frequentist statistics, often question the dependence of
the Bayesian approach upon the prior distribution. Whilst it is clearly better to have a
prior distribution that takes account of real information that ‘you’ may have prior to
seeing the system in operational test, it can be difficult to elicit these prior beliefs and
express them as a probability distribution. This was our main motivation for using an
‘ignorance’ uniform prior in the illustrative examples here. However, the results we
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obtained from using this are interesting also because they correspond so closely to the
classical ones for the (p0, ) and (0, ) cases. Thus a non-Bayesian might think of the
uniform distributions as approximating to his or her prior beliefs. If, in addition, it is
accepted that the predictions (n0, )  and (t0, ) are better ways of expressing reliability
requirements, it follows that the results of Tables 2 and 4 must be preferred to those of
Tables 1 and 3.
References
[Abramowitz & Stegun 1970] M. Abramowitz and I. A. Stegun, Handbook of
Mathematical Functions, Dover, New York, 1970.
[Adams 1984] E. N. Adams, “Optimizing preventive maintenance of software
products”, IBM J. of Research and Development, 28 (1), pp.2-14, 1984.
[Johnson & Kotz 1969] N. L. Johnson and S. Kotz, Distributions in Statistics:
Discrete Distributions, John Wiley, New York, 1969.
[Littlewood & Strigini 1993]  B. Littlewood and L. Strigini, “Assessment of ultra-high
dependability for software-based systems”, CACM, 36 (11), pp.69-80, 1993.
[Miller et al. 1992]  W. M. Miller, L. J. Morell, R. E. Noonan, S. K. Park, D. M.
Nicol, B. W. Murrill and J. M. Voas, “Estimating the probability of failure when
testing reveals no failures”, IEEE Trans Software Engineering, 18 (1) 1992.
[Parnas et al. 1991]  D. L. Parnas, G. J. K. Asmis and J. Madey, “Assessment of
safety-critical software in nuclear power plants”, Nuclear Safety, 32 (2), pp.189-98,
1991.
Appendix
Some mathematical observations
The illustrative xamples on the discrete and continuous topping rules in
Sections 2 and 3 were deliberately chosen to have similar numerical goals. Readers will
observe that the resulting entries in Tables 1 and 3 are also numerically close, as are
those in Tables 2 and 4. This is clearly no coincidence, and arises from the relationship
between the (discrete) Bernoulli process and the (continuous) Poisson process. If, in
section 3, we let hours be the unit of measurement, and in section 2 define a demand to
be one hour’s operation, then we can see the failure process as either a sequence of
independent trials with probability of failure per trial p, or a Poisson process with rate
. Here
p = 1 - e-
approximately, as long as  is mall (so that the chance of more than one failure within
the one hour ‘demand’ period is negligible).
We should then expect results that are the same (except for the discrete
rounding) between the discrete and continuous models when these have identical prior
distributions. If  has a Gamma(a, b) prior, then
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p ~ 
ba
G (a)
[ - log(1- p)]a - 1(1- p)b - 1
Thus the Gamma(1, b) prior for  cor esponds to the Beta(1, b) prior for p. With these
priors, the results should be almost identical between the discrete and continuous
models. In fact, the uniform priors used in both section 2 and section 3 correspond to
Beta(1, 1) and Gamma(1, 0+)1 respectively. This is an example of the obvious fact that
being completely indifferent between (i.e. have uniform prior belief for) any pair of
values of, say,  does not correspond to being completely indifferent between any pair
of values of p = 1 - e-  (nor, in general, of any function of ).
Uniform prior distributions have only been used in the previous s ctions t
illustrate our general approach. Of course, if ‘you’ have genuine prior knowledge, you
should represent it in a proper prior distribution. Having said that, the uniform prior
used in section 3 has an interesting scale-invariance property: ‘ignorance’ is represented
in exactly the same mathematical form, regardless of units. This carries through into the
predictive distribution, so that, for example, the probability of surviving failure-free for
a time kt given that there have been no failures in time t, will be a function of k only.
Indeed all questions about future behaviour given past observations can be answered
without asking the questioner what time units are involved. The stopping rule used
above, using the improper prior, is a particular instance of this scale-invariance
property: using the Tables above we do not need to know the units of time involved. It
can be shown that this scale-invariance does not hold for stopping rules based on any
proper priors (clearly the uniform prior is the only one for which prior beliefs are scale
invariant), for example the proper Gamma(a,b) prior gives a total required testing time
t = 1 + 2 + ...+ j + tj + 1 = t0
(1- )
1
j + a
1 - (1- )
1
j + a
- b
A cursory inspection of Table 4 shows that t i close to linear in j. This is a
consequence of the fact that
(1- )
1
j + 1
1 - (1- )
1
j + 1
=
j + 1
- log(1- )
-
1
2
+ O(1j + 1)
with the linear function represented by the first two terms on the right giving a very
good approximation for realistic (i.e. small) values of   ev n for small j. For example,
the error in using this linear approximation is less than .001% for =0. , even at j=0.
Thus the successive differences in the first column of Table 4 converge rapidly to
4628.4. This can be regarded as the length of failure-free operation required of the next
test, when every previous test has ‘only just’ failed.
Relation between Bayesian and frequentist pfd-based stopping
rules
We shall show here that the ‘classical’ solution to the stopping rule based upon (p0, )
gives a table of numbers corresponding to Table 1, but with each entry increased by 1.
                                                
1 The uniform p( )=1 is the limiting case of Gamma(1, b) as b ® 0 +
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The jth entry in the Table, in the case of the Bayesian solution, is given by the smallest
value of N, say N1, satisfying
pj(1- p)N - j
B( j + 1,N - j + 1)0
p0
ò dp³ 1-
For the classical solution it is the smallest value of N, say N2, satisfying
NCr p0
r(1- p0)
N - r ³ 1 -
r = j + 1
N
å
Now,
pj(1- p)N - j
B( j + 1,N - j + 1)
dp= N + 1Crp0
r (1- p0)
N - r + 1
r = j + 1
N+ 1
å
0
p0
ò
is obtained by applying repeated integration by parts to the left hand side [Johnson &
Kotz 1969, p63]. It follows immediately that N2 = N1+1.
Relation between Bayesian and frequentist rate-based
stopping rules
To show that the results of Section 3.1, using the uniform Gamma(1,0+) prior, are
identical to those that would be obtained from a classical frequentist approach, we need
to prove (in the notation of (19)) that
p( |j,t;1,0)d = P(Xt > j| 0)
0
0
ò ,
that is,
tj + 1 je- t
j!
d =
( 0t)
re- 0t
r!r = j + 1
¥
å
0
0
ò ,
which again follows by repeated integration by parts of the left hand side.
Proof of conservatism of stopping rule in Section 2.2
We need to prove that the total number, N, of tests required when there have been r
failures observed is a convex function of r. The proof requires some properties of the
function
h(z) =
1
z
+
1
z + 1
+ ...+
1
z + n0 - 1
= (z + n0) - (z)
where n0 is an integer n0 ³ 2, and  is the Digamma function [Abramowitz & Stegun
1970] (z) =
d
dz
logG (z):
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1. h is a decreasing, positive function of z>0;
2. The function h'(z)h(z)2  is a negative, strictly increasing (for 0³ 2) function of
z > 0.
To prove 2, note that the numerator of 
d
dz
h'(z)
h(z)2
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
 is h'' (z)h(z)2 - 2h'(z)2h(z)  and
proving that, for z>0, this is strictly (for n0³ 2) positive is equivalent to applying the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the pair of n0-vectors 
1
(z + i)
1
2
i = 0
n0 - 1
 and 
1
(z + i)
3
2
i = 0
n0 - 1
.
Now our stopping rule is equivalent to choosing N just large enough so that
P(No failure in (N +1)th to (N + n0)th demands given r failures in first N demands)
³ 1- , i.e.
1 - £
(r + 1,N + n0 - r + 1)
(r + 1,N - r + 1)
=
G (N - r + 1+ n0)G (N + 2)
G (N - r + 1)G (N + n0 + 2)
.
If we replace r and N by continuous variables  and , with  defined so that equality
holds in
G ( - + 1 + n0)G ( + 2)
G ( - + 1)G ( + n0 + 2)
= 1- (A)
we can treat  as a function of  and N(r) is obtained as the smallest integer greater than
or equal to the value of  c rresponding to =r.
Taking logs in (A) gives
logG ( - + 1 + n0) - logG ( - + 1)[ ] - logG ( + 2 + n0) - logG ( + 2)[ ] = log(1- )
and differentiating both sides with respect to 
d
d
- 1
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ h( - + 1)-
d
d
h( + 2) = 0
we  see that we can characterise the function ( ) as the solution to the ordinary
differential equation
d
d
=
1
1 -
h( + 2)
h( - + 1)
(B)
with the initial conditions
(0) = n0(
1
- 1)- 1, (C)
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obtained by substituting = 0 in (A) and then solving for .
To show that ( ) is a convex function, we will first show that
0 <
h( + 2)
h( - + 1)
< 1 for all > 0 (D)
It will then only remain to verify that 
h( + 2)
h( - + 1)
 is an increasing function of >0,
and the convexity of ( ) will follow. From property 1 of the function h, the
inequalities
0 < - + 1 < + 2
will give us (D). Here, since  is positive, the RH inequality follows trivially from the
left. Suppose there is some >0 for which £ -1. By taking 1 to be the least such
>0 we obtain a contradiction since we will have from (C) (0)-0>-1³ ( 1)- 1 with
d
d
( - ) > 0 throughout the interval Î ( 0 , 1). So (D) holds. Concerning the
monotonicity of 
h( + 2)
h( - + 1)
, note first that, from (B),
d
d
=
h( - + 1)
h( - + 1)- h( + 2)
,    
d
d
- 1 =
h( + 2)
h( - + 1)- h( + 2)
.
So we have, after some simplification
d
d
h( + 2)
h( - + 1)
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
=
h'( + 2)h( - + 1)2 - h( + 2)2h'( - + 1)
h( - + 1)- h( + 2)[ ] h( - + 1)2
=
h( + 2)2
h( - + 1)- h( + 2)
h'( + 2)
h( + 2)2
-
h'( - + 1)
h( - + 1)2
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
(E)
Under the same conditions as before the term in the parentheses in (E) is positive from
property 2 of h. Thus the expression (E) is positive. Hence 
d
d
 is increasing as
required.
Proof of conservatism of stopping rule in Section 3.2
From (31) it can be seen that we need to show that the function
f ( j, ) =
(1- )
1
j
1 - (1- )
1
j
is convex, for then f ( j + 1, ) - f ( j, ) > f ( j, ) - f ( j - 1, ) as required.
The second derivative of f with respect to j is
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2 f( j, )
j2
=
(1- )
1
j log(1- ) 2j - 2(1- )
1
j i + log(1- ) + (1- )
1
j log(1- )( )
1 - (1- )
1
j( ) 3 j 4
If we make the substitution
y = -
log(1- )
2j
,
which is a decreasing positive function of j, we get
2 f( j, )
j2
=
16e2yy3(1- e2y + y + e2yy)
(- 1 + e2y)3log(1- )2
.
All terms of this are obviously positive, except the bracketed expression in the
numerator. This is also obviously positive except for the case 0<y<1. Expanding, we
have
1 - e2y + y + e2yy =
2
3
y3 +
2
3
y4 +
2
5
y5 +
8
45
y6 +
4
63
y7 +
2
105
y8 + O(y9)
and the coefficient of yn in this Taylor series is 
2n- 1(n - 2)
n!
 for n = 3, 4, 5, . ., which
completes the proof.
